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Analyzing the International Criminal Court Complementarity 
Principle Through a Federal Courts Lens
Introduction 
 The signing of the Rome Statute that created the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) was viewed by many in the international law community as a constitutional 
moment not unlike the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789.1 In giving birth to a new 
type of legal institution, the Rome Statute created a void in the ability of any existing 
body of law to precisely convey the nature of the ICC.  The Court is neither in a direct 
vertical nor horizontal relationship to State courts, with the result that traditional 
international or national legal norms do not apply.2 The federal courts in relation to state 
courts initially encountered much the same problems that the ICC is encountering in 
relation to national courts because the federal court system provided an entirely new way 
of imagining the American legal structure.3 Although the comparison is not perfect, the 
similarities in the situations render the doctrines of federal courts law highly relevant to a 
study of the manner in which the ICC can interact with States.4 Federal courts law 
contains a wealth of doctrines such as exhaustion and abstention that are useful both for 
explaining ICC deference to State proceedings, a regime known as complementarity, and 
how or when the ICC can or should deviate from that initial deference.  
 
Background 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) came into existence as a result of a 
multilateral convention, known as the Rome Statute, that was signed on July 17, 1998.  
The Rome Statute was voted into effect by 120 States and the Court was born on July 1, 
2002.  With almost a hundred ratifications, the Court is now in its third year of existence.  
The Court consists of the Presidency, Chambers, in which the judges sit, the Office of the 
Prosecutor, which is responsible for receiving referrals, and conducting investigations 
and prosecutions, and the Registry, which is responsible for non-judicial aspects of the 
administration of the Court.  In the greater context, the ICC is the first court of its kind.  It 
is a permanent criminal court whose nearest relatives are the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
1 Leila Nadya Sadat and S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution,
88 GEO. L. J. 381, 407 (2000). 
2 See Harold Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623 
(1998) (differentiating between horizontal regimes in which nation states interact on a state-to state level 
within treaty regimes, and vertical regimes in which international legal norms are promoted from one body 
and are integrated through trickle-down into each nation at a domestic level; the ICC does not require 
integrating legislation by State Parties, yet it does not interact on a state-to-state level, thus occupying a 
strange in-between space). 
3 Wilfred Ritz, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789: EXPOSING MYTHS,
CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING NEW EVIDENCE 5 (1990) (“The most striking fact about the new 
national judicial system is that it was in fact new.…it must be emphasized that the state judiciaries that 
existed at the end of the eighteenth century were not organized in [the current] fashion, and that part of the 
controversy surrounding Article III arose on this historical fact.”). 
4 See Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in Foreign Affairs Law, __ DUKE J. COMP. INT’L L. ___ 
(2005) (forthcoming) (proposing the need to apply federal courts theory to the relationship of 
“supranational courts” to domestic institutions). 
2(ICTR), both of which, however, are UN bodies that have limited geographical and 
temporal jurisdiction.5
After a heated negotiation process in which the interests of sovereign States and 
human rights groups and other NGOs clashed over the intended strength of the Court, the 
Rome Statute bestowed upon the ICC a complementarity regime that gives States the 
primary claim to conduct proceedings in cases which might otherwise qualify for ICC 
jurisdiction.6 This idea is embodied in paragraph 10 of the Rome Statute’s Preamble as 
the idea “that the International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be 
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.”  Unlike the ICTY and ICTR charters 
which give those courts primacy over any national proceedings,7 the ICC is meant to be 
secondary and only provide a forum when the State proceedings fail.  For this purpose, 
the Court under Article 17 retains the ability to initiate investigations and prosecutions if, 
and only if, it is able to show that the State is either not taking any action or that the State 
is “unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.”  The idea 
is that, “[i]n exercising its jurisdiction, the Court will be acting as an extension of the 
territorial and national criminal jurisdiction available to States Parties; by limiting such 
exercise to where States are unable or unwilling, the Statute shows that the Court is not 
also an extension of States Parties’ national criminal justice systems. It does not replace 
or supplant national jurisdictions.”8 Crucial to this regime is the consent of the States 
who, through their signatures, “recognize the Court’s jurisdiction over all the crimes 
within its jurisdiction.”9 The foundation of the Court’s jurisdiction is State consent and it 
acts only as an extension of the national systems when the States are incapable, not as an 
appellate court.10 
To this end, the Court has a very specific realm in which it is designed to 
function.  The ICC has only subject matter jurisdiction over the crimes listed and defined 
5 See generally, Roy S. Lee, Introduction, in Roy S. Lee, ed., THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE 
MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS RESULTS 1 (1999); William Schabas, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 1-25 (2004); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Historical 
Survey: 1919-1998, in M. Cherif Bassiouni and Bruce Broomhall, ICC RATIFICATION AND NATIONAL 
IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION, 13 Nouvelles Études Pénales 1 (1999). [hereinafter, Historical Survey]
6 See Philippe Kirsch and John T. Holmes, The Rome Conference on an International Court: The 
Negotiating Process, 93 AMER. J. INT’L L. 2 (1999); Otto Triffterer, Preliminary Remarks: The Permanent 
ICC – Ideal and Reality, in Otto Triffterer, ed., COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS’ NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 43 (1999); John T. Holmes, 
The Principle of Complementarity, in Lee, ed., supra note 5, at p.41 [hereinafter Principle of 
Complementarity]; Bruce Broomhall, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT: BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 67-78 (2003) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL 
JUSTICE].  See also generally, William Driscoll, Joseph Zompetti, and Suzette Zompetti, eds., THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: GLOBAL POLITICS AND THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE (2004). 
7 See Mohammed El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement 
International Criminal Law, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 869, 882-889 (2002); John T. Holmes, Complementarity: 
National Courts versus the ICC, in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, and John Jones, eds., THE ROME 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 668-70 (2002). [hereinafter National 
Courts versus the ICC]
8 Bruce Broomhall, The International Criminal Court: Overview and Cooperation with States in Bassiouni 
and Broomhall, eds., supra note 5, at 143. [hereinafter Overview and Cooperation]
9 Id.. at p.64. 
10 See Holmes, Principle of Complementarity, supra note 6, at 49 (citing the concerns of States that the 
Court not function as a court of appeal). 
3within the statute itself – namely, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.11 
Additionally, the Court is limited to crimes committed after the enactment of the 
Statute,12 and the Court’s jurisdiction can only be exercised via one of three ways: 
referral by a State Party, referral by the Security Council, or the Prosecutor may initiate 
an investigation based on his proprio motu power.13 
Although complementarity is typically deemed a safeguard for national 
sovereignty, it actually encompasses a dual capacity.  From a simple viewpoint, 
complementarity allows the Court to defer to national judiciaries and prevents the Court 
from taking jurisdiction away from States.14 The interface of ICC and national 
jurisdiction, however, also creates an area of expansion for ICC jurisdictional reach by 
allowing the Court itself to review and assess national judiciaries.  The tension between 
the Court’s twofold mandate to practice both restraint and autonomy again recalls the 
federal court system’s need to manage state court independence while maintaining the 
supremacy of federal law and the Constitution. 
The ICC in its incipient stages of development thus faces the challenge of 
delineating limitations and standards for its process of admitting cases.  Just as the 
Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison reserved to itself the ability to determine its own 
jurisdiction,15 so the Rome Statute charges the ICC with the task of determining the 
extent of its own jurisdiction.16 As part of its task, the Court must make determinations 
on admissibility requirements, a task which begins with the guidelines prescribed by the 
Rome Statute.  Although the word complementarity is not used in the Rome Statute, the 
idea is embodied in several parts of the treaty.  For example, the Preamble states that the 
ICC “shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.”17 The crux of the 
complementarity scheme, however, lies in Articles 17 which addresses admissibility.  In 
short form, Article 17 requires the Court to consider a case inadmissible when (a) a State 
is already investigating or prosecuting, (b) the State has already investigated and decided 
not to prosecute, (c) the accused has already been tried or (d) the case is not of sufficient 
gravity.  A case is admissible, however, if the Prosecutor can prove that any of the 
preceding scenarios resulted from the State’s “unwillingness” or “inability” to 
11 These are listed and defined with great specificity in Art. 5-8.  Crimes of aggression were tabled under 
Art. 123 for further discussion and possible adoption at the first Review Conference seven years after the 
entry into force of the Rome Statute.  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the 
U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 
on July 17, 1998, pmbl. P10, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998) available at 
http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/99_corr/cstatute.htm (last checked April 27, 2005). [hereinafter Rome 
Statute] 
12 This is under jurisdiction ratione temporis in Article II of the Rome Statute. 
13 Rome Statute, supra note 11, Art. 13-15. 
14 Complementarity is not precisely aligned with jurisdiction in that it hinges on admissibility, a type of 
“quasi-jurisdictional” standard for determining the ICC’s caseload which lacks a counterpart in federal 
courts law.  See Christopher Blakesley et al, Association of American Law Schools Panel on the 
International Criminal Court, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV 223, 247-49 (1999).  For purposes here, however, 
equating admissibility with a decision on jurisdiction is sufficient. 
15 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
16 See Holmes, National Courts versus the ICC, supra note 7, at 672 (“The ICC is arbiter of its own 
jurisdiction.…Article 19(1), for example, provides that the Court shall satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction 
in any case.  Article 17(1), states that it is the Court which shall determine whether a case is 
inadmissible.”). 
17 Rome Statute, supra note 11, Preamble para. 10.  See also, Art. 1.   
4“genuinely” prosecute.  The unwillingness factor is evaluated on the basis of whether the 
national proceedings were designed to shield the accused or constituted an unjustified 
delay inconsistent with bringing the accused to justice.  Inability, meanwhile, is 
determined on the basis of whether “due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability 
of its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary 
evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.”18 
The complexities of the ICC’s complementarity scheme are best explored through 
a hypothetical extrapolation of the Security Council’s recent referral of the Darfur 
situation in Sudan according to Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute.19 Unlike the Court’s 
current investigations in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo and its most 
recent referrals for Côte d’Ivoire and the Central African Republic, all of which are 
signatories of the Rome Statute and which were referred by the States themselves under 
Article 13(a), Sudan is not a signatory of the Rome Statute.  Prior to the Security Council 
referral, the ICC Prosecutor was thus not able to contemplate an investigation of the 
Darfur situation.  Sudan has responded vehemently that the ICC has no jurisdiction over 
its citizens and that it will not cooperate with the ICC in any pursuant investigation.20 
Ignoring for now the inevitable enforcement and cooperation issues which would 
arise with the advent of an ICC investigation of a non-cooperative State, the more 
pressing question raised by the Darfur situation is how the Court addresses the issue of 
admissibility.  Because the previous referrals have come from the States themselves, 
amounting to a waiver of the admissibility requirement,21 the Court has never actually 
addressed admissibility.  The exceptions to complementarity seem theoretically simple 
enough – mere proof of unwillingness or inability – but when faced with Darfur, a 
situation in which the national government and judiciary is actually intact and unwilling 
to cede to ICC jurisdiction, forging ahead freely with a claimed right to review and 
prosecute does not seem that simple. 
The first scenario for Darfur is the no-man’s land state of affairs such as existed 
before the Sudanese government created the Darfur Special Criminal Court, a three-judge 
traveling court, in June 2005.  Prior to that time, the Sudanese government had not 
opened a formal investigation into the situation in Darfur, although all parties were 
doubtless aware of the numerous atrocities which had been committed.  The Khartoum 
regime, despite the international outcry over its handling of Darfur, continually made 
reassurances to the international community that it was properly managing the situation 
without actually committing to anything.22 The Prosecutor, meanwhile, must act on the 
18 Id., Art. 17(3). 
19 The crisis in Darfur is well-documented by groups such as Human Rights Watch, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, Doctors Without Borders as well as nations around the world.  The American 
government evaluated the killings in Darfur as rising to the level of a genocide.  See CNN, Powell Calls 
Sudan Killings Genocide, Sept. 9, 2004, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/africa/09/09/sudan.powell/ (last checked April 27, 2005). 
20 Warren Hoge, “International War Crimes Prosecutor Gets List of 51 Sudan Suspects,” New York Times,
April 6, 2005 (Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir swore “thrice in the name of Almighty God…I shall 
never hand any Sudanese national to a foreign court” and vowed to prosecute war crime suspects itself). 
21 See infra at p.28 for discussion about referrals and waivers. 
22 See, e.g., Koert Lindijer, Analysis: Reining in the Militia, BBC NEWS, Oct. 25, 2004, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3594520.stm (last checked April 27, 2005). 
5referral handed down by the Security Council.23 Article 53 bestows the Prosecutor with 
discretion to dismiss the situation, listing several factors that may form the basis of 
dismissal, including admissibility under Article 17.24 On a practical level, even a 
Security Council referral will not abolish the Prosecutor’s need to evaluate the 
admissibility of a case either before or after an investigation begins. 
According to the Court’s own guidelines, in the absence of any current or past 
State action on the matter, the ICC faces no impediment to commencing an 
investigation.25 The Court presumes that if it has an interest in beginning an investigation 
and a State is lodged in an “inaction” stage, admissibility is not an issue that necessitates 
debate because inaction equates to clear admissibility.26 This stance on the inaction 
scenario is noticeably stronger than the words used in Article 17 and elsewhere in the 
Rome Statute.  For example, Article 17(1) utilizes a double negative type of structure to 
state that a case is inadmissible unless the elements of unwilling or unable are present. 
The presumption underlying complementarity is deference to national prosecution unless 
the State shows itself to be ill-equipped.  An interpretation of the Court’s stance 
regarding complete State inaction may be that inaction is the most severe type of 
unwillingness which merits omission of the admissibility determination. 
A slightly different scenario is envisioned under Article 17(1)(b).  For a case in 
which the State has already conducted an investigation and decided not to prosecute, the 
ICC must cede and consider the case inadmissible unless the decision not to move 
forward was spurred by the State’s unwillingness or inability.27 Although inadmissibility 
is not as easily waived for this situation, the inaction of the State will still lead to an 
assumption of admissibility by the Court in the absence of ongoing proceedings, or else 
an evaluation of the State’s willingness or ability which will likely spur the State into the 
next scenario discussed below.  In either case, for practical purposes inaction and a 
decision to not prosecute will be approached in the same way by the Court. 
Darfur in this first scenario in which it has either no history of an investigation or 
prosecution or no intention of commencing proceedings, thus creates very little clash 
between ICC and national jurisdiction since only one jurisdiction – that of the Court – is 
being asserted.  Realistically, this stage will almost never persist unless the State, for 
23 There is the temptation to view a Security Council referral as a clear waiver of any admissibility 
considerations.  See El Zeidy, supra note 7, at 957 (stating “from a purely formal standpoint…the referral 
of a situation by the Security Council is deemed a reasonable basis for the Prosecutor to initiate an 
investigation, without the preventive review of the admissibility of the situation with an eye to the 
application of the principle of complementarity.”).  One view even goes as far as stating that the Prosecutor 
is required to launch an investigation after a Security Council referral and has discretion to discontinue 
only after the investigation has begun.  See Schabas, supra note 5, at 123. 
24 In addition to admissibility, Article 53(1) specifies that the Prosecutor may consider whether there is “a 
reasonable basis to believe that a crime” has been committed and whether, “taking into account the gravity 
of the crime and the interests of the victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an 
investigation would not serve the interests of justice.” 
25 Office of the Prosecutor Informal Expert Paper, The Principle of Complementarity in Practice,
International Criminal Court (2003), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/otp/complementarity.html  (last 
checked April 27, 2005). [hereinafter Complementarity in Practice]
26 Id. (“the most straightforward scenario is where no State has initiated any investigation (the inaction 
scenario).  In such a scenario, none of the alternatives of Articles 17(1)(a)-(c) are satisfied and there is no 
impediment to admissibility.  Thus, there is no need to examine the factors of unwillingness or inability; the 
case is simply admissible under the clear terms of Article 17.”)  
27 Sharon Williams, Issues of Admissibility, in Triffterer, ed., supra note 6, at 393. 
6some political reason, secretly desired the ICC intervention and proceeds to cooperate 
with the ICC.28 Otherwise, the inaction stage seems inextricably tied to a negative 
response on the part of the State whose jurisdiction has been questioned. 
The State’s reaction to the ICC intention to investigate leads to the second 
scenario which is the current situation.  The Sudanese government followed through with 
its statements and began its own national proceedings against the alleged perpetrators of 
crimes punishable under the Rome Statute.  Because the Darfur referral came via the 
Security Council, the Court’s response follows different rules than for a State Party 
referral or an exercise of the Prosecutor’s proprio motu powers.29 According to Article 
19 of the Statute, Sudan is allowed to challenge the admissibility of the case to the ICC, 
which it presumably would do if it were conducting its own proceedings.  Article 19 
makes no specific requirement upon the Prosecutor to defer to the State investigation, 
which means this second scenario branches into two paths: 1) the Prosecutor defers to the 
State in much the same manner as he would under Article 18,30 or 2) he prepares to make 
the case that the Sudanese government is conducting proceedings that qualify Sudan as 
“unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.”31 If the 
Court chooses to defer to Sudan, it can neatly follow many of the doctrines which define 
the basis of federal courts law.  But if the Court, after taking stock of Sudan’s 
proceedings and determining that they do not meet Rome Statute standards, decides to 
remove the investigation or prosecution to the ICC, it can utilize some of the exceptions 
to the doctrines to define its boundaries and explain its determinations. 
The first option most closely achieves the goal of promoting national prosecutions 
and follows the path of least resistance by deferring to national proceedings.  The Court, 
by deferring to the State, supports the presumption that the State has  the primary or 
dominant claim to jurisdiction.32 This tension between ICC and national jurisdiction is 
almost identical to a cornerstone of American federal courts law – the tension between 
federal and state power.  Federal courts as created under Article III of the Constitution 
were designed to implement the powers of the national government and provide a 
uniform interpretation of the Constitution and federal laws.33 The basic premise of the 
28 See infra, note 165. 
29 If the situation is referred to the Court by a State Party under Article 13(a) or is initiated by the 
Prosecutor’s use of the proprio motu power under Articles 13(c) and 15, then the Prosecutor must fulfill 
certain obligations according to Article 18, which does not, however, refer to Security Council referrals like 
Darfur.  Under Article 18, the Prosecutor must notify all State Parties and the relevant States whose 
jurisdiction may overlap.  If a State informs the Court within one month of the notification that it is 
investigating or has investigated the possible violations of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor must defer to 
the State investigation unless the Pre-Trial Chamber authorizes further investigation.  The Prosecutor is 
allowed to review the State’s investigation after six months and determine if there is any issue with 
unwillingness or inability. 
30 See Antonio Cassese, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections, 10 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 144, 159 (1999) (“although no notification is necessary in case of referral by the Security 
Council under Article 13(b), any state having jurisdiction over the crimes which form the object of the 
referral is entitled to inform the Prosecutor that it is investigating or prosecuting the case…thus obliging the 
Prosecutor to defer to the state’s authorities.”) 
31 Rome Statute, supra note 11, Art. 17(1)(a). 
32 See Broomhall, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 86; Schabas, supra note 5, at 67-68 (“The 
jurisdiction that the international community has accepted for its new Court is narrower than the 
jurisdiction that individual States are entitled to exercise with respect to the same crimes.”). 
33 Erwin Chemerinsky, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 2 (2003). 
7federal court system – that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and that state 
courts are courts of general jurisdiction – cedes only a parcel of jurisdiction to the federal 
courts,34 a setup analogous to the way in which the ICC only maintains “concurrent” 
jurisdiction over a narrow segment of a State’s law.35 Federal courts over the years have 
had to work around the initial limitations, resulting in a body of prescriptions federal 
courts use to restrain themselves which may provide good theoretical underpinnings to 
future ICC decisions. 
 
Exhaustion of State Remedies Prior to Federal Habeas 
One such doctrine federal courts follow in deferring to state jurisdiction is 
exhaustion of state remedies.  On a practical level, without requiring exhaustion of state 
remedies, federal courts would not be able to handle the volume of cases which would 
flood its circuits36 and state court proceedings might face unduly delays and interference 
as parties invoked federal proceedings.37 More importantly, however, the state 
exhaustion requirement embodies a conscious effort to defer to states as legitimate and 
equal seats of jurisdiction.38 By deferring to national proceedings, the ICC can invoke 
this tradition of exhausting state remedies. 
Federal habeas review is the most well-known residence of the exhaustion 
requirement.  The doctrine was codified in 28 U.S. C. §2254(b), but the presumption that 
state remedies should be exhausted existed even before then.39 Exhaustion seeks to 
preserve the delicate balance between federal and state powers in order to better protect 
both federal and state institutions.  In part,  
Exhaustion preserves the role of the state courts in the application and 
enforcement of federal law.  Early federal intervention in state criminal 
proceedings would tend to remove federal questions from the state courts, 
isolate those courts from constitutional issues, and thereby remove their 
understanding of and hospitality to federally protected interests.  Second, 
34 Id. at p.259-65. 
35 The status of ICC jurisdiction as “concurrent” is not necessarily unanimous.  See Sadat and Carden, 
supra note 1, at 414 (pointing to the exercise of ICC jurisdiction only under certain exceptional 
circumstances).  In the federalism sense, however, the relationship of the ICC to national jurisdictions is 
clearly analogous to concurrent jurisdiction and, as discussed below, the manner in which federal and state 
courts address concurrent jurisdiction is highly relevant to an analysis of any ICC-State relationships.  See 
Ruth Philips, The International Criminal Court Statute: Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 10 CRIM. L. F. 61, 
63 (1999). 
36 See Chemerinsky, supra note 33, at 649 (“Such concurrent jurisdiction is desirable because, in the vast 
majority of cases, it is preferable for the Court to hear cases on appeal and not serve as a trial court.  The 
Supreme Court lacks the time and resources to function effectively as a court of original jurisdiction.”). 
37 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399 (1900). 
38 See Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886) (stating “the injunction to hear the case summarily, and 
thereupon ‘to dispose of the party as law and justice require’ does not deprive the court of discretion as to 
the time and mode in which it will exert the powers conferred upon it.  That discretion should be exercised 
in the light of the relations existing, under our system of government, between the judicial tribunals of the 
Union and of the States, and in recognition of the fact that the public good requires that those relations be 
not disturbed by unnecessary conflict between courts equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by 
the Constitution.” (italics added)).   
39 See United States ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U.S. 13, 17 (1925) (“The due and orderly administration 
of justice in a state court is not to be thus interfered with save in rare cases where exceptional 
circumstances of peculiar urgency are shown to exist.”); Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 116-18 (1944). 
8exhaustion preserves orderly administration of state judicial business, 
preventing the interruption of state adjudication by federal habeas 
proceedings.  It is important that petitioners reach state appellate courts, 
which can develop and correct errors of state and federal law and most 
effectively supervise and impose uniformity on trial courts.40 
Of these reasons, the first is particularly relevant to the ICC because of the Court’s small 
capacity and its reliance on the continued goodwill of the international community.  The 
ICC is a court of last resort not equipped to handle more than a few selected cases at a 
time.41 Additionally, the Court will fare better in gaining cooperation for a subsequent 
ICC proceeding if it protects the State’s proceedings as much as possible.42 The ICC 
equivalent of the “federally protected interests” is the interest in protecting State resolve 
to prosecute the crimes under the Rome Statute.43 If made to feel like an inadequate 
forum, a State may not work as hard to show its own capability, thereby defeating the 
Court’s purpose of encouraging States to bring perpetrators to justice.44 In the case of 
Sudan, the Security Council referral has put the spotlight on the country and if the ICC 
were to defer to national proceedings, Sudan would know that its every action was being 
scrutinized.  In order to avoid further breach of international relations or sanctions, Sudan 
would most likely attempt to conducts its proceedings in accordance with some minimum 
standard of “being conducted independently or impartially” consistent with “an intent to 
bring the person concerned to justice.”45 
This then integrates the second reason for the exhaustion requirement, that of 
letting the state “develop and correct errors of state and federal law.”  Under the system 
of complementarity, the ICC has a secondary mandate of developing State interpretations 
and applications of the Rome Statute.  When the Court watches and reviews the 
proceedings of national jurisdictions in order to determine the constitution of acceptable 
proceedings that avoid the ICC’s reach, it is in fact propounding a set of guidelines for 
national laws and proceedings.46 The Court and States may engage in a system of trial 
40 Note, Developments in the Law: Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1094 (1970).  See 
also, Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 490 (1973) (Justice Brennan 
writing, “The exhaustion doctrine is a judicially crafted instrument which reflects a careful balance between 
important interests of federalism and the need to preserve the writ of habeas corpus as a ‘swift and 
imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement.’…It cannot be used as a blunderbuss to 
shatter the attempt at litigation of constitutional claims with regard to the purposes that underlie the 
doctrine and that called it into existence.”). 
41 See Holmes, National Courts versus the ICC, supra note 7, at 667-73. 
42 See Broomhall, Overview and Cooperation, supra note 8, at 47. 
43 See Rome Statute, supra note 11, Preamble para. 6 (“Recalling that it is the duty of every State to 
exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes”). 
44 See Broomhall, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 86 (“Because the Court has the power to make 
the final decisions on the admissibility of cases before it, States that wish to avoid the adverse attention, the 
diplomatic entanglements, the duty to cooperate and other consequences of ICC activity have a real 
incentive to take action against crimes under the Statute.”). 
45 Rome Statute, supra note 11, Art. 17(2)(c).  The importance of this wording lies in its vagueness.  While 
an ICC review of national proceedings would not call for a specific outcome, its requirements as to what 
would satisfy inadmissibility leave States in a position where they really have to make the best good-faith 
effort possible. 
46 See Michael Newton, Comparative Complementarity: Domestic Jurisdiction Consistent with the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, 167 MIL. L. REV. 20 32-33 (2001); Bassiouni, Historical 
9and error, but States will eventually come to mold their national laws according to the 
ICC body of law.47 The wonder of the exhaustion process is that it does not require the 
ICC to brandish its authority in order to achieve integration of Rome Statute components 
into the national law – the Court can stay on the sidelines while the national courts feel 
the burden of the Court’s watchful eye exhorting the State to do its best. 
 Related to the development of nationals laws is one of the most fundamental 
issues the ICC faces within the complementarity scheme – the lack of any required 
implementing legislation on the part of the signatory States.  The Rome Statute would 
have faced  a wave of resistance if it had pushed through with a requirement that all State 
Parties implement the Statute’s substantive law.48 Although the Statute does impose an 
obligation on States to cooperate under Part 9, that duty does not extend to legislation 
incorporating the crimes.49 The resulting gap between the Rome Statute and national 
laws is a potential complication for any review of national proceedings purporting to 
determine ability, willingness and genuineness.  Utilizing national domestic laws, what 
can be called the “ordinary crimes approach,” a State with good intentions could fulfill its 
role according to admissibility requirements without charging for the same crimes as the 
Rome Statute.50 
For example, if the Sudanese government investigated and/or prosecuted several 
individuals for murder or rape (encompassed in the atrocities alleged in Darfur) according 
to their national laws as “ordinary crimes,” the ICC could not automatically determine 
that the national proceedings were insufficient because they did not prosecute the 
defendants for genocide or crimes against humanity.  Under a vertical application of the 
doctrine of ne bis in idem, a relative of the American double jeopardy doctrine, spelled 
out in Article 20, the Court must not prosecute a person already tried by another court for 
the same conduct, even if the charge was for an “ordinary crime.”51 Only on a showing 
Survey, supra note 5, at 2 ; Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Nationalizing International Criminal Law, 41 STAN. J. 
INT’L L. 1, 8-9 (2005). 
47 Jann Kleffner, The Impact of Complementarity on National Implementation of Substantive International 
Criminal Law, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 86, 94 (2003) (“in order for the ICC to effectively perform its 
complementary function, comprehensive implementation is indispensable.  To interpret the provisions on 
complementarity so as to give them the fullest weight and effect consistent with the ICC’s functions 
therefore involves an obligation on States parties to establish their jurisdiction over the ICC crimes to the 
extent required for the purpose of national prosecution.”). 
48 Id. at 91. 
49 See Iontcheva Turner, supra note 46, at 8. 
50 Kleffner, supra note 47, at 95-99.  See also Schabas, supra note 5, at 88; Complementarity in Practice,
supra note 25, at 8 (“It was extremely important to many States that proceedings cannot be found ‘non-
genuine’ simply because of a comparative lack of resources or because of a lack of full compliance with all 
human rights standards.  The issue is whether the proceedings are so inadequate that they cannot be 
considered ‘genuine’ proceedings.  Of course, although the ICC is not a ‘human rights court,’ human rights 
standards may still be of relevance and utility in assessing whether the proceedings are carried out 
genuinely.”). 
51 See Christine Van den Wyngaert and Tom Ongena, Ne bis in idem Principle, Including the Issue of 
Amnesty, in Cassese et al, eds., supra note 7, at 724-25; Leila Sadat, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 190 
(2002); Schabas, supra note 5, at 88.  But see Broomhall, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 91 
(pointing to a situation in which a case becomes admissible when the national laws, “be they definitions of 
crimes, general principles, or defences – define an area of responsibility markedly narrower than that 
provided for in the Statute, allowing de facto impunity for acts punishable by the Court.”). 
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that the State is not conducting the investigation genuinely, or that it has conducted a trial 
only to shield the perpetrator or not “independently or impartially in accordance with the 
norms of due process recognized by international law and [the trial was] conducted in a 
manner which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent with an intent to bring the person 
concerned to justice” can the Court exert its own jurisdiction.52 A State which has not 
passed implementing legislation is not thus an automatic target of an ICC admissibility 
exception, but the possibility that the ICC could find the “ordinary crimes” prosecution 
an exception to the ne bis in idem doctrine may still motivate States to strive for 
compliance with the Rome Statute to the best of their abilities. 
 
Final Judgment Rule 
The final judgment rule is another doctrine of federal courts with a similar 
underpinning.  While exhaustion doctrine applies to habeas proceedings and is a 
collateral attack on state convictions, the final judgment rule applies the same concept to 
the broader area of Supreme Court appellate review of state court decisions.  The final 
judgment rule finds its statutory authority in 28 U.S.C. §1257, although the roots of 
Supreme Court review goes further back.53 
The general power of the Supreme Court to review state court decisions was 
granted by Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.  The Supreme Court, elaborating in 
cases like Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee54 and Murdock v. City of Memphis,55 clarified the 
nature of its appellate power.  Among the reasons for allowing such review, the Supreme 
Court pointed to the fact that “state attachments, state prejudices, state jealousies, and 
state interests, might sometimes obstruct, or control, or be supposed to obstruct or 
control, the regular administration of justice.…[I]n controversies between…a state and its 
citizens…it enables the parties, under the authority of congress, to have the controversies 
heard, tried and determined before the national tribunals.…This is not all.  A motive of 
another kind, perfectly compatible with the most sincere respect for state tribunals, might 
induce the grant of appellate power over their decisions.  That motive is the importance, 
and even necessity of uniformity of decisions throughout the whole United States, upon 
all subjects within the purview of the constitution.”56 The ICC is faced with a similar 
dilemma when dealing with States.  Although the ICC is not an appellate court in relation 
to national courts, it is in many ways the creation of the will of an international 
community that wished to maintain some semblance of “uniformity” in the way the world 
combats genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.  In that respect, the mandate 
52 Rome Statute, supra note 11, Art. 20(3)(a)-(b). 
53 §1291 also promotes the final judgment rule, but in the context of appeals from federal district courts to 
courts of appeals.  For purposes here, §1257 is more relevant because “appeals brought to the Supreme 
Court under section 1257 involve the transmission of cases or issues between separate judicial 
systems.…[it] implicates the relationship between the states and the federal government, and hence the 
special concerns of federalism and comity.”  Note, The Finality Rule for Supreme Court Review of State 
Court Orders, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1004, 1012 (1978) [hereinafter Finality Rule]. 
54 14 U.S. 304 (1816). 
55 87 U.S. 590 (1875). 
56 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. at 347.  Notice particularly the assumption that the judicial power to 
review encompassed controversies between “a state and its citizens” – in the realm of Rome Statute crimes, 
a large number of the most difficult cases will inevitably involve governments turning on their own people, 
such as in Serbia, Sudan, etc. 
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of the Court may often involve seeing through the national prejudices and jealousies to 
administer justice, although the ICC may not possess the power to actually do so.57 
The very concerns that restrain the ICC from overreaching its jurisdiction into 
areas of State sovereignty also appeared in Murdock. Recognizing the vast reach 
appellate review would otherwise have over state court decisions, the Supreme Court 
found, “It cannot, therefore, be maintained that it is in any case necessary for the security 
of the rights claimed under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States that the 
Supreme Court should examine and decide other questions not of a federal character.”58 
This clever construction accomplishes the dual purpose of restraining the Supreme Court 
from overreaching in its use of appellate power by deferring to states on issues of state 
law, while cementing the right of the Supreme Court to review federal issues.   
While the ICC does not have the luxury of distinguishing a clear set of 
supranational laws from national laws via which it can precisely follow the rationales 
underpinning Martin or Murdock, 59 it can, however, maintain a better sense of when to 
defer by simply recognizing the very fact that it is situated differently than the Supreme 
Court in Martin and Murdock. The lack of clarity surrounding the law the ICC is 
supposed to be upholding and the fact that the ICC is prevented from deferring on the 
basis of differences in law,60 means that, even more than the Supreme Court, the ICC 
needs to see how States interpret the alleged conduct through their own proceedings 
before it makes any decisions, a goal which can be serviced by application of a final 
judgment rule theory.61 
The final judgment rule is, like exhaustion doctrine in habeas cases, just another 
manner of qualifying federal review to protect state proceedings from needless 
interference.62 Whether for reasons of judicial efficiency, or comity and federalism,63 
57 See Iontcheva Turner, supra note 46, at 11-14. 
58 Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. at 632-33. 
59 Unlike the history and tradition upholding both federal and state law, the very existence of international 
criminal law is ephemeral – it is an interstitial body of law in the space between international treaties and 
conventions, domestic criminal codes, transnational crime, and, now increasingly, crimes of State.  See 
Broomhall, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 9-24; M. Cherif Bassiouni, INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW CONVENTIONS AND THEIR PENAL PROVISIONS 15-21 (1997); Young, supra note 4, at p.___.  
The ICC cannot easily call upon the principles of “international criminal law” to justify its need to 
intervene.  The Court’s mandate envisions its role in setting an international standard for international 
criminal law.  Iontcheva Turner, supra note 46, at 4.  But the reality is that there is very little consensus 
about precisely what law the ICC is even clarifying. 
60 See supra note 50 for discussion on national prosecutions of “ordinary crimes” and the idea that 
prosecution by a State on the basis of its national laws is not in and of itself sufficient to render the case 
admissible for purposes of an ICC investigation.  
61 Finality Rule, supra, note 53, at 1013-14 (“By facilitating the development of alternative grounds for the 
disposition of cases, the rule of finality under section 1257 permits the Court to avoid unnecessary 
decisionmaking.”). 
62 Id. at 1006 (“The entire case approach – with its corresponding finality rule – rests in part upon the 
supposition that efficiency is best served by restricting appellate interruptions of the trial process to an 
absolute minimum.  By preserving the integrity of the trial, the rule of finality under the entire case model 
[as opposed to the ‘individual issue’ model] obviously facilitates continuity and results in a speedier 
disposition of the case.  The finality rule also finds support in considerations other than efficiency.  The 
interests of litigants in securing justice is served when controversies are resolved in the most expeditious 
fashion consistent with preserving the requirements of due process.  Significantly. from the standpoint of 
fairness to the parties, the prohibition of interlocutory appeals prevents dilatory tactics by those litigants 
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federal court deference to state courts in anticipation of a final judgment is mirrored in 
the ICC relation to national courts.  The Rome Statute attempts to limit the number of 
appeals and challenges to admissibility rulings, yet its need to maintain flexibility allows 
the Prosecutor a rolling basis on which to review admissibility decisions.64 For example, 
if the ICC decided to defer to the Sudanese government because the case was 
inadmissible in light of ongoing investigations, the Prosecutor could after six months, if 
he felt there was new evidence or a change that rendered the case admissible, reopen 
admissibility proceedings for Darfur.  If, however, the Court were to adhere to a final 
judgment type of doctrine by waiting until a final national judgment were rendered, the 
Court could preserve its legitimacy and authority better because it would avoid a series of 
reversals in admissibility decisions.   
 
Abstention 
 Exhaustion of state remedies and the final judgment rule are just a few analogous 
federal courts doctrine which might be applicable to justifying ICC deference.  The 
several abstention doctrines developed by federal courts outline different reasons why 
federal courts are not to interfere with state proceedings.  Unlike exhaustion doctrine, a 
type of collateral attack which places the federal courts in a position of waiting for the 
final state pronouncement, abstention is applicable when a motion for an injunction of the 
state proceeding is filed in the federal court.  In this light, exhaustion might be more 
similar to the Court’s application of ne bis in idem which occurs after a national 
proceeding, while abstention is closer to the Court’s role before or during an investigation 
or prosecution.  A closer examination of the Younger abstention doctrine clarifies the 
similarities for ICC jurisdiction. 
 In the broad realm of state and federal concurrent jurisdiction, substantial overlap 
has required the development of rules of engagement for federal courts.65 Abstention is a 
judicially-developed type of limitation on federal court jurisdiction, the most relevant 
type of which is the Younger abstention.66 Also known as equitable restraint, it can be 
characterized as the “judicially created bar to federal court interference with ongoing 
state proceedings.”67 Sprouting from the Supreme Court decision in Younger v. Harris 
who can afford to subject their adversaries to attrition or who have an interest in delaying completion of the 
trial.”).  See also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 477-78 (1975). 
63 Id. at 503-05 (J. Renhnquist, dissenting). 
64 Rome Statute, supra note 11, Art. 18(3) (“The Prosecutor’s deferral to a State’s investigation shall be 
open to review by the Prosecutor six months after the date of deferral or at any time when there has been a 
significant change of circumstances based on the State’s unwillingness or inability genuinely to carry out 
the investigation.”); Article 19(10) (“If the Court has decided that a case is inadmissible under article 17, 
the Prosecutor may submit a request for a review of the decision when he or she is fully satisfied that new 
facts have arisen which negate the basis on which the case had previously been found inadmissible under 
article 17.”). 
65 See Richard Fallon, Daniel Meltzer, and David Shapiro, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1144-48 (2003). 
66 The Younger abstention is not precisely in the same category as the other abstentions such as Pullman,
Thibodaux or Burford. For purposes here, however, it will be considered a form of abstention.  See Martin 
Redish, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 281 (1990). 
67 See Chemerinsky, supra note 33, at 796. 
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and its companion cases,68 the doctrine of Younger abstention is premised on notions of 
equity, comity and federalism.69 When a state court prosecution is pending, Younger 
calls for federal courts to refrain from issuing injunctions, effectively giving deference to 
state jurisdiction.70 Younger was a necessary creation after federal courts found 
themselves flooded with filings seeking injunctions of state court proceedings following 
Dombrowski v. Pfister, a case in which the Supreme Court allowed for a federal court 
injunction of a state court proceeding.71 Although there is debate about the notion of 
comity which Younger embraces,72 the idea works well in the ICC system, which lacks an 
appellate or hierarchical structure.73 
The overlap of ICC and national systems is precisely mirrored in the system 
acknowledged by Younger and the application of federal abstention is a very useful 
example for the ICC.   If Darfur were to begin investigating or prosecuting in response to 
the Security Council referral, according to the theory of exhaustion of state remedies, the 
ICC should defer to Sudan’s proceedings and only after the conclusion of those 
proceedings would the Court be eligible to review Darfur for admissibility.  Under the 
Younger abstention doctrine, however, the Court is justified in making a determination to 
defer not because it must first defer to the national proceedings, but because it chooses to 
leave the ongoing proceedings in the national courts.  A crucial outcome with a Younger 
abstention, however, is that the federal decision to not interfere with the state proceeding 
irrevocably leaves federal issues to be adjudicated in the state proceedings.74 Although 
68 Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 
U.S. 82 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971). 
69 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971) (Justice Black writing, “courts of equity should not act, and particularly should not act 
to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer 
irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.…This underlying reason for restraining courts of equity from interfering 
with criminal prosecutions is reinforced by an even more vital consideration, the notion of ‘comity,’ that is, a proper 
respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state 
governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their 
institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.  This, perhaps for lack of a better 
and clearer way to describe it, is referred to by many as ‘Our Federalism.’”). 
70 See Martha Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine,
122 U. PA. L. REV. 1071, 1163-65 (1974) (comparing and pointing out that, unlike the Pullman abstention 
in which the presumption is for federal jurisdiction, Younger presumes state jurisdiction before it examines 
for special circumstances). 
71 380 U.S. 479 (1965).  See Frank Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The 
Significance of Dombrowski, 48 TEX. L. REV. 535, 606 (1970) (pointing out the flood of cases into federal 
courts). 
72 401 U.S. at 43-44 (noting that “this underlying reason for restraining courts of equity from interfering 
with criminal prosecutions is reinforced by an even more vital consideration, the notion of ‘comity,’ that is, 
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of 
separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if 
the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.”).  
See also, Fallon et al, eds., supra note 65, at 322-26 (citing the debate about the existence, or lack of, parity 
between state and federal courts). 
73 See Holmes, National Courts versus the ICC, supra note 7, at 673 (noting that “delegations were mindful 
that the ICC was not envisaged as an appellate body to review decisions of domestic courts.”). 
74 Field, supra note 70, at 1164; Fallon et al, supra note 65, at 1227 (“In Younger cases…the federal court 
dismisses the suit, and the underlying federal claims must typically be adjudicated in the context of a state 
criminal case, subject only to Supreme Court review.  As the Court later held in Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 
90 (1980), the state court adjudication will have full res judicata effect in subsequent federal court 
proceedings.”). 
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the ICC is not bound by a strict doctrine, it should maintain an awareness that an 
application of a Younger-type justification for a deferral to State jurisdiction leaves the 
Court open to criticism if it later finds the State proceeding deficient in some way and 
delves into issues already settled in the State proceedings.75 
Exceptions 
 Each doctrine mentioned so far can be utilized by the Court to support its 
decisions to defer to national proceedings.  Their usefulness, however, is not limited to 
their positive application since the Court will face less challenges for deferring to States 
than when it attempts to confront a State with the determination that it is unwilling or 
unable to such an extent that the ICC can intervene.  The ICC can rely on any number of 
justifications for why a case is not admissible76 with the real difficulty being how to 
justify why a case is admissible.  These federal courts doctrines are therefore most 
valuable to the ICC’s complementarity scheme because they all include exceptions that 
can be utilized in prescribing boundaries for the ICC’s vague standards for finding cases 
admissible.77 
Although the Rome Statute was intentionally written with flexible language that 
would be acceptable to the greatest number of signatories,78 the resulting mix of objective 
and subjective standards leaves the Court vulnerable.79 The complementarity regime 
overall has an objective procedure which allows for challenges, notification, deference, 
and ne bis in idem among other provisions.  Yet the criteria at the heart of the 
admissibility determinations in Article 17 are premised on subjective elements such as 
“substantial collapse”80 of the national judicial system or “an intent to bring the person 
75 This consideration is most relevant to a situation like Darfur in which the Security Council referral 
balances the scale toward an ICC proceeding (some would say an investigation is mandatory, see Schabas, 
supra note 5, at 123).  If an ICC investigation is already proceeding, the Prosecutor would have to 
affirmatively justify under Article 53(2) why he wishes to halt the investigation.  Otherwise, for State Party 
referrals or exercises of the proprio motu power, if the Court has deferred to a State proceeding under 
Article 18(2), then under 18(3) the Prosecutor may review the State proceedings after six months or “at any 
time when there has been a significant change of circumstances based on the State’s unwillingness or 
inability genuinely to carry out the investigation.”   
76 Rome Statute, supra note 11, Art. 53(1)(c).  This gives the Prosecutor discretion to take into account “the 
gravity of the crime and the interests of the victims, [whether] there are nonetheless substantial reasons to 
believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice.  As Prof. Shapiro has pointed out with 
regard to the federal system, the grant of jurisdiction does not impose an obligation to exercise of 
jurisdiction at all times. See David Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985). 
77 Keep in mind that in an application of most of these exceptions, the ICC (embodied as the ICC 
Prosecutor) acts in a role analogous to that of criminal defendants or civil plaintiffs in state courts seeking 
federal review.  This role, in turn, is in many respects as a proxy for victims who are otherwise unable to 
seek any vindication of their rights.  See David Donat-Cattin, The Role of Victims in the ICC Proceedings,
in Flavia Lattanzi, ed., THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT STATUTE 251 
(1998); Christopher Muttukumaru, Reparation to Victims, in Lee, ed., supra note 5, at p.262. 
78 See Sadat, supra note 51, at 119; Holmes, National Courts versus the ICC, supra note 7, at 674 
(discussing high degree of States’ sensitivity to proposed terms such as “ineffective,” “diligently,” and 
“good faith” that resulted in the term “genuinely” in Article 17); El Zeidy, supra note 7, at 900. 
79 Holmes, Principle of Complementarity, supra note 6, at 75-76 (pointing out the subjective elements in all 
the criteria for unwillingness as well as for the inability). 
80 Rome Statute, supra note 11, Art. 17(3). 
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concerned to justice.”81 These subjective elements imply discretionary implementation 
of the complementarity regime, a situation mirrored in federal courts law.   
Federal courts law has similarly encountered the realization that its doctrines are 
not entirely rigid and that there is sometimes a need to exercise discretion to make room 
for circumstances justifying exceptions – the doctrines are within the jurisdictional reach 
of the federal courts, but the jurisdictional grant does not abolish exceptions.82 Federal 
courts address the discretionary nature of their doctrines by creating concomitant 
doctrines of exceptions. 
 
Exceptions to Exhaustion of State Remedies 
 Although exhaustion has been codified in 28 U.S. C. §2254, its roots as a 
judicially created doctrine reveal the types of exceptions anticipated.  The Supreme Court 
from early on has presumed the exhaustion of state remedies but for “cases of exceptional 
urgency.”83 When contemplating the types of situations that qualified as cases of 
exceptional urgency, the Supreme Court in U.S. ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler pointed to two 
cases involving “interferences by the state authorities with the operations of departments 
of the general government, and the other concerned the delicate relations of that 
government with a foreign nation.”84 The Supreme Court has accepted as part of the 
exhaustion doctrine that only rare cases of peculiar urgency justify interference in state 
courts,85 but these are situations that can be analogized to ICC findings of admissibility. 
 According to Article 17(1) of the Rome Statute, exceptions to the presumption of 
inadmissibility must meet the standard of unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute 
genuinely.  Although standards for unwilling and unable are spelled out in 17(2)-(3), they 
do not clearly specify what might qualify as “shielding,” “an intent to bring the person 
concerned to justice,” and “total or substantial collapse.”  But looking at cases justifying 
exceptions to exhaustion provide may provide some useful considerations.86 For 
example, In re Neagle,87 In re Loney,88 and Hunter v. Wood89 are cases in which 
exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine were granted because the state proceedings were 
81 Id., Art. 17(2)(b). 
82 Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, supra note 76, at 545, 574 (“Those who espouse the obligation 
theory of federal jurisdiction frequently overlook or understate the range of situations in which the theory 
simply does not accord with the facts.…[A]s experience and tradition teach, the question whether a court 
must exercise jurisdiction and resolve a controversy on its merits is difficult, if not impossible to answer in 
gross.…Moreover, questions of jurisdiction are of special concern to the courts because they intimately 
affect the courts’ relations with each other as well as with the other branches of government.  Therefore, the 
continued existence of measured authority to decline jurisdiction does not endanger, but rather protects, the 
principle of separation of powers.”). 
83 269 U.S. at 18. 
84 Id. at 19. 
85 Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 117-18 (1944). 
86 See Larry Yackle, The Exhaustion Doctrine in Federal Habeas Corpus: An Argument for a Return to 
First Principles, 44 OHIO ST. L. J. 393 (1983) (providing a look at the historic development of the 
exhaustion doctrine). 
87 135 U.S. 1 (1890) (concerning a deputy marshal discharged on habeas from state custody for murdering 
an assailant in the performance of his duty to protect a justice of the court). 
88 134 U.S. 372 (1890) (concerning petitioner discharged on grounds that state prosecution would impede 
and embarrass the administration of justice in a national tribunal). 
89 209 U.S. 205 (1908). 
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seen as impairing some aspect of federal governance.   Similarly, Wildenhus’ Case90 
treats interference with federal government treaty rights.  These cases are probably most 
analogous to any charges of shielding which the ICC may want to bring against States.  
Although the fact pattern in the U.S. cases may be completely opposite any situations 
faced by the ICC (eg. In re Neagle concerns a state wishing to prosecute while the federal 
government is looking to pardon), the underlying theory for these situations is the 
dominant or overriding federal interest.  The ICC as charged with its mandate to “put an 
end to impunity…and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes”91 can claim an 
exception if the State’s behavior goes so far as to interfere with aspects of the Court’s 
ability to attain those goals. 
 Another class of exceptions to exhaustion doctrine consists of cases “where the 
state remedy is seriously inadequate.”92 This exception is analogous to some situations in 
which the ICC is not able to point easily to shielding or an intent to avoid justice.  In 
Moore v. Dempsey, the Court did not require exhaustion of state remedies if “the whole 
proceeding is a mask – that counsel, jury and judge were swept to the fatal end by an 
irresistible wave of public passion, and that the State Courts failed to correct the wrongs, 
neither perfection in the machinery nor the possibility that the trial court and counsel saw 
no other way of avoiding an immediate outbreak of the mob can prevent this Court from 
securing to the petitioners their constitutional rights.”93 Similarly, Mooney v. Holohan,
although it ultimately denied federal habeas on the grounds that a “corrective judicial 
process” was available at the state level, found that deprivation of due process via 
contrivances such as perjury or intimidation was unacceptable and ultimately required 
correction.94 
The ICC may find itself similarly situated in that national proceedings may put on 
the appearance of following due process or standard procedures, yet amount to a sham in 
reality.  The cases of Moore, Mooney and Ex parte Hawk give some of the reasoning that 
can be used in justifying admissibility for such a case.   Moore provides an outline of a 
state proceeding that may be affected by public perceptions or pressures.  As applied to 
the ICC in Darfur, imagine that the Sudanese government conducts its own proceedings 
and proceeds to acquit several alleged perpetrators.  If the ICC were to find that the 
judges or jury (if applicable) were daily critiqued in the newspapers or that there were 
90 120 U.S. 1 (1887) (concerning a Belgian sailor who was discharged from state custody because the arrest 
was contrary to an international treaty). 
91 Rome Statute, supra note 11, Preamble para. 5. 
92 Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 692 (1948) (J. Reed, dissenting). See Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. at 118 (“But 
where resort to state court remedies has failed to afford a full and fair adjudication of the federal 
contentions raised…a federal court should entertain his petition for habeas corpus, else he would be 
remediless.”). 
93 261 U.S. 86, 91 (1923). 
94 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (“We deem it sufficient for the present purpose to say that we are unable to 
approve this narrow view of the requirement of due process.  That requirement, in safeguarding the liberty 
of the citizen against deprivation through the action of the state, embodies the fundamental conceptions of 
justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions.…It is a requirement that cannot be 
deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and hearing if a state has contrived a conviction through the pretense 
of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate 
deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured. Such a contrivance by a 
state to procure the conviction and imprisonment of a defendant is as inconsistent with the rudimentary 
demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like result by intimidation.”). 
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frequent demonstrations in the streets calling for acquittal of the defendants, the Court 
might not be able to find that the national procedures were on their face unwilling or 
unable or that there was an intentional shielding or obstruction of justice.  Yet the reality 
may be that the national proceedings are unable to protect the validity of the outcome in 
light of external pressures such that the proceedings are clearly unjust.  The ICC might 
thus be able to apply the Moore reasoning under Article 17(3) by attributing such external 
interference to a “substantial collapse or unavailability” of the national judiciary.   
 Mooney, on the other hand, points to a federal understanding of what qualifies as 
due process as the standard by which the state courts must obey.  In the ICC context, due 
process and other disembodied legal principles that are not uniformly accepted are 
extremely difficult to account for in any admissibility review.  Because each State has its 
own national legal system which the ICC must respect and balance against the 
international community’s standards of justice, the ICC will always have a difficult time 
pinning any admissibility exceptions on national procedural deficiencies.95 Concerns 
with this unsettled aspect of the ICC’s jurisdictional reach has already driven some 
countries to not ratify the treaty.96 Wielding a justification like Mooney provides, 
however, may drive other countries closer to informal compliance.97 But mostly Mooney 
will be helpful for situations that are in the middle between total compliance and 
complete rejection of any international standards to which the ICC subscribes (eg. 
torture) – where the State has exercised its jurisdiction but on “narrower grounds than 
contemplated by the Statute…allowing de facto impunity for acts punishable by the 
Court.”98 For example, the law in Sudan is a mixture of customary law, Islamic shari’a 
law and democratic law in an infant state.99 Due process may be largely absent without 
minimal protections such as a defendant’s right to counsel.100 If the Sudanese 
government were to prosecute and acquit an alleged genocide perpetrator through its 
normal process utilizing Sudanese judges and courts, the ICC on review would likely find 
problems in the judicial process leading to an unjust result despite the procedural 
perfection.  The ICC may have a difficult task pronouncing the subtleties of the Sudanese 
system to be outright corruption as opposed to part of its customary law heritage.  So how 
does the Court tactfully avoid passing judgment on the intact judiciary of a country that 
does not confess to a total or even substantially collapsed judicial system?  The Court 
cannot make admissibility decisions on the basis of outcomes in a way that effectively 
pushes States to litigate toward a certain end, and yet it cannot state that the intact judicial 
system of one nation does not administer justice in a way that is equal to the way another 
95 This is part of a larger and very complicated discussion which includes the placement of amnesties 
within the purview of ICC jurisdiction.  See Michael Scharf, The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of 
the International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 507 (1999).  The abuse of alternative measures 
such as amnesty laws and proceedings in Chile and Cambodia on the one hand, contrasted with the success 
of proceedings such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa on the other, only serves 
to highlight the difficulty in categorically deferring or being wary of national proceedings. 
96 Iontcheva Turner, supra note 46, at 8, fn. 36. 
97 See Broomhall, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 89-90. 
98 Id. at 91. 
99 See Aharon Layish and Gabriel Warburg, THE REINSTATEMENT OF ISLAMIC LAW IN SUDAN UNDER 
NUMAYRI (2002); Adib Halasa, John Cooke, and Ustinia Dolgopol, THE RETURN TO DEMOCRACY IN 
SUDAN: REPORT OF A MISSION ON BEHALF OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS (1986); John 
Wuol Makec, THE CUSTOMARY LAW OF THE DINKA PEOPLE OF SUDAN (1988). 
100 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, SUDAN: ATTACKS ON THE JUDICIARY (1991). 
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nation does.  Following the Mooney approach effectively upholds the presumption of 
deference to national proceedings while making it known that the national proceedings, 
though not inferior or lacking, may have made an error in the particular instance 
requiring a “corrective judicial process to remedy the wrong.”101 The advantage of the 
Mooney format is thus when a State brings a case within its normal parameters, which 
may be narrower grounds than the Court ultimately requires such that a patently unjust 
result occurs, the Court experiences no need to pronounce the national government as 
unable according to Article 17(3), but can say the State is unwilling if it does not provide 
the “corrective judicial process.” 
 The exceptions to habeas exhaustion doctrine have been codified in 28 U.S.C. 
§2254(b) as well.  In relevant part, §2254 reads: “An application for a writ of habeas 
corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not 
be granted unless it appears that (A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in 
the courts of the State; or (B)(i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; 
or (ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the 
applicant.”  The Supreme Court has read this to mean that an exception to exhaustion will 
be made “only if there is no opportunity to obtain redress in state court or if the corrective 
process is so clearly deficient as to render futile any effort to obtain relief.”102 An 
example of this was Wilwording v. Swenson, a case in which the Supreme Court allowed 
an exception to the exhaustion doctrine because the state court had never granted a 
hearing on the issues being litigated in the instant case in other similar cases – the 
existence of corrective proceedings was therefore meaningless.103 
As applied to the ICC, exception (B)(i) could be made analogous to an unable 
claim under Article 17(2) while exception (B)(ii) would be analogous to unwilling 
according to Article 17(3), although Wilwording and Duckworth lead to the belief that the 
two categories can actually be collapsed into one if the national proceedings, though 
available, are so egregious that they become equivalent to an absence of further 
corrective proceedings.  Applying the exceptions under §2254 in this way thus takes the 
ICC one step further towards an admissibility finding by declaring whatever national 
remedies exist will be insufficient to fulfill the Rome Statute’s definition.  In defining 
those standards, the ICC could look to the reasoning given in Wilwording – the complete 
absence in the state’s history of ever proceeding in the way the Supreme Court 
considered corrective.  Similarly, if the national court of Sudan claimed that it had an 
appeal process but had never in its history actually completed an appeal, that would 
provide the ICC with enough reason to find admissibility grounds in the same way the 
Supreme Court did in Wilwording. Part of this analysis is thus comparison to the State’s 
previous practices in order to determine if the State exhibits a pattern of such behavior.104 
Exceptions to Final Judgment Rule 
101 Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. at 113. 
102 Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981).  See Chemerinsky, supra note 33, at 887. 
103 404 U.S. 249 (1971). 
104 The advantage of seeking out a pattern in another application is that if the Court is able to determine that 
the State normally proceeds in a particular pattern, but in the instant case veers from its normal course, the 
Court has a stronger case against the State for unwillingness on the basis of shielding or an intent to avoid 
justice.  See Holmes, National Courts versus the ICC, supra note 7, at 675. 
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As codified in 28 U.S.C. §1257, the final judgment rule provides, “Final 
judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could 
be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari….”  Controversy 
over what constitutes a final judgment105 or what it means to be the highest court in 
which a decision can be made106 has rendered the final judgment rule subject to many 
exceptions.  The most coherent treatment of the nature of exceptions to the finality rule 
came in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn.107 Coming after a string of cases in which 
exceptions for non-final cases were made,108 Cox attempted to sort the types of cases 
justifying exceptions into four broad categories.   
The four categories are generally further divided into two groups: the first two 
types of exceptions pertain to cases in which the federal issue survives further 
proceedings, and the second two classes of exceptions relate to cases in which the federal 
issue may be mooted but review is nonetheless justified.  The first two are perceived as 
reasonable and practical exceptions in light of the finality rule, while the second two are 
seen as an expansive interpretation of the Supreme Court’s power to override the final 
judgment rule.109 In the ICC context, however, the exceptions are not divided in the same 
way because realistically, there is no clear ICC law that can be distinguished from 
national laws such that survival of an ICC issue is ever a real basis for intervening in a 
State process.  The ICC is evaluating for issues of unwillingness or inability according to 
Article 17(2)-(3), so the relevant comparison is about how the finality exceptions can 
help define the State’s unwillingness or inability.  For the most part, though, these 
exceptions may be more useful for borderline cases that are more diplomatically handled 
under Article 17(3)’s inability standard where there is no indication of a State’s blatant 
unwillingness through shielding or impartial proceedings, situations which would surely 
generate other more obvious evidence allowing admissibility. 
 In the first category are “those cases in which there are further proceedings – even 
entire trials – yet to occur in the state courts but where for one reason or another the 
federal issue is conclusive or the outcome of further proceedings preordained.  In these 
circumstances, because the case is for all practical purposes concluded, the judgment of 
the state court on the federal issue is deemed final..”110 This class of cases might be 
considered relatives of the second class of exceptions under §2254(b) in which the 
existence of a corrective process is irrelevant because the process is, “as a practical 
105 See Catlin v. U.S., 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (stating that “final” means when the judgment or decree 
“ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.”). 
106 See, e.g., Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960) (finding the Police Court to be the highest 
court by virtue of a procedural limitation); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
107 420 U.S. 469 (1975).  The verdict may be out on whether the exceptions have become so scattered or 
unclear as to have rendered the Cox categories archaic or to have overtaken the actual finality rule itself. 
See Finality Rule, supra note 53, at 1004-05 (finding “the cumulative effect of these ad hoc exceptions to 
the rule of finality is a rather confusing common law of appellate jurisdiction”); Redish, supra note 66, at 
247.  For purposes here, the Cox categories are still useful in illustrating the types of exceptions. 
108 See Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120 (1945); Local No. 438 Construction and General 
Laborers’ Union v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 (1963); Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555 
(1963). 
109 Finality Rule, supra note 53, at 1015. 
110 Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. at 479.  Cox cites Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966) and 
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971) as illustrative of this category.  See also 
Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989).   
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matter,”111 concluded.  This typically involves a case in which there is no further defense 
based on state law and the state has already ruled against any defense based on a federal 
issue.  In the federal context, these types of cases are most important when there is a 
constitutional right which risks being diminished by further delay.  In the ICC context, 
however, since there are no analogous supranational rights to vindicate, this type of 
exception is probably most comparable to cases of procedural rulings resulting in 
procedural limitations.112 For example, if the courts in Sudan had a process in which a 
lower judge ruled that crucial testimony of certain witnesses, without which acquittal 
would be guaranteed, could not be taken and this kind of ruling would be carried through 
all further national proceedings, the Court might look at that as a case in which, for all 
practical purposes, the national proceedings were final.  The implication toward the State 
would be that, of several options available, it chose the worst one that now prevents 
further proceedings from being meaningful.  Such a ruling would not necessarily imply 
an intent on the part of the government to shield or prevent justice, although it might be 
very likely, so this scenario might be perceived as placing the ICC in the uncomfortable 
position of passing judgment on the validity of a national proceeding.  But by limiting the 
finality exception to just one issue (eg. the ruling in the particular case regarding 
admission of testimony) and framing it as a choice the State made although it had other 
options, the ICC might be able to avoid the accusation that it is passing judgment on an 
entire national system while still being able to contend that, on that one issue, because of 
“unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain…the necessary 
evidence and testimony.”113 The ICC can thus make the argument, if not under 
unwillingness standards, then under the unavailability standard of Article 17(3). 
 The second category of Cox exceptions involve cases “in which the federal issue, 
finally decided by the highest court in the State, will survive and require decision 
regardless of the outcome of future state-court proceedings.”114 As examples of this 
category, the Cox court pointed to Brady v. Maryland115 and Radio State WOW, Inc. v. 
Johnson,116 and the recent case of NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.117 also fits this 
category.  Applied to the ICC, this category is very difficult to analogize because of the 
inability of the ICC to recognize Rome Statute crimes as more legitimate than “ordinary 
crimes” in national laws – although the ICC has specified certain conduct as genocide or 
crimes against humanity, the same conduct can be tried by a national judiciary as an 
ordinary crime that may not carry the same sentencing or consequences as a Rome 
111 Finality Rule, supra note 53, at 1015. 
112 The limitation would be some sort of restraint on the government’s ability to prosecute further, not the 
defendant’s available defenses. 
113 Rome Statute, supra note 11, Art. 17(3). 
114 420 U.S. at 480. 
115 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (Supreme Court granting review when case was remanded solely for issue of the 
defendant’s punishment despite the defendant’s challenge of the prosecutor’s actions as unconstitutional 
because regardless of the outcome of the punishment issue, the defendant would still be entitled to an 
appeal based on the constitutional issue.  The constitutional issue was independent of the events at the 
punishment proceedings.). 
116 326 U.S. 120 (finding that the federal issue would survive the state proceedings which remanded only 
for determination of damages). 
117 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (Supreme Court granting review for case in which Mississippi Court remanded 
case to trial court on the issue of damages because the federal law issues would not be resolved in further 
state court proceedings). 
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Statute crime.  This category of exceptions basically requires a decision by the ICC that 
no matter what the State does, it will leave an issue unresolved which will require the 
ICC’s intervention.  Even more strongly than the first category, this type of exception 
requires the Court to make a judgment about the capability of the national courts to fully 
handle a prosecution.  A hypothetical case would consist of the highest Sudanese court 
remanding a murder case to a lower court for further proceedings only on a perjury issue.  
If the ICC felt that the further State proceedings would not affect the acquittal on the 
murder charges, it would still have trouble justifying intervention on those grounds.  The 
ICC would have trouble proving admissibility on a State’s final judgment, much less 
justifying interference as an exception to the final judgment rule – intervening because 
the Court feels the acquittal was the wrong decision would be very difficult to defend.  
Although the first category of Cox exceptions does tend to characterize the State’s further 
proceedings as mere formality, it leaves open the possibility that the national system is 
still valid but merely unable to reach the needed result in this particular instance.  This 
second category, however, requires a more blatant characterization of the State’s system 
as wrong or inadequate to prosecute Rome Statute types of crimes altogether, a depiction 
the ICC would be wise not to adopt. 
 Cox’s third category includes “those situations where the federal claim has been 
finally decided, with further proceedings on the merits in the state courts to come, but in 
which later review of the federal issue cannot be had, whatever the ultimate outcome of 
the case.”118 Citing California v. Stewart119 and North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy 
v. Snyder’s Drug Stores, Inc.,120 Cox allows for federal interference before a final state 
judgment when the federal issue will be permanently lost if the case proceeds in state 
courts.  In the context of the ICC in Sudan, this might translate into a case in which 
Sudan is attempting to prosecute a defendant for genocide based on Rome Statute 
guidelines, but in the course of its proceedings, makes a ruling that certain evidence of 
mass sterilization cannot be collected.  If the case for genocide proceeded in the national 
system on some other grounds, the ICC may never have a chance to prosecute the alleged 
conduct of mass sterilization and the perpetrators may never be tried for that particular 
conduct at all.  This third category of exceptions can thus be characterized as allowing the 
ICC to intervene when State procedural barriers prevent proceedings on issues relevant to 
the ICC’s realm of interest, and while ICC intervention will undoubtedly stir debate, it is 
likely less than if it claimed a right to intervene over an area of substantive State law.121 
The ICC in this exception creates a bubble for itself if it uses this type of exception to 
preserve issues relevant to the Court, and if it does so by pointing to a deficiency in the 
state’s procedural process.  This would qualify under Article 17(3) as an inability on the 
118 420 U.S. at 481. 
119 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (the Supreme Court citing a state court judgment as final because “acquittal of the 
defendant at trial would preclude, under state law, an appeal by the state.”). 
120 414 U.S. 156 (1973) (the Supreme Court finding that the issue of whether a North Dakota law was 
constitutional needed to be decided before the case proceeded in state courts or else the constitutional issue 
would never be addressed). 
121 Finality Rule, supra note 53, at 1021-22 (although “the Court will generally give effect to reasonable 
rules of state procedure…[b]ut since the independent and adequate state grounds doctrine as applied to state 
procedural law rests primarily upon considerations of comity – as opposed to a congressional statute, which 
underlies the doctrine as applied to state substantive law – the Court need not observe state procedural law 
as scrupulously as it must state substantive grounds.”). 
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part of the State, while not imputing to the State an intentional shielding or intent to avoid 
justice. 
 The last Cox category of exceptions is by far the most confusing.  In its distilled 
form, “interlocutory review is permitted (1) when ‘reversal of the state court on the 
federal issue would be preclusive of any further litigation on the relevant cause of action,’ 
and (2) when failure to consider the state court decision immediately ‘might seriously 
erode federal policy.’”122 The Cox opinion cites Curry, Langdeau, and Miami Herald 
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo123as the cases most reflective of this category of exception.  
This class is very similar to the third category except that in that category, the Supreme 
Court intervenes because it is the only certain time at which it might be able to review the 
issue.  The fourth category, however, includes exceptions for when review might be had 
later as well.124 This characteristic tends to shift category four exceptions toward an 
“individual issue model” in which the Supreme Court chooses to review independent 
issues that it deems important to federal interests.125 Although the ICC may find this type 
of exception useful, it needs to be careful that reviewing a State proceeding mostly 
because it serves an important ICC interest may come too close to creating an unwelcome 
hierarchy.  While the other three categories of exceptions to finality doctrine rely on 
circumstances in which the ICC may step in because the State is proving unwilling or 
unable, this category seems to indicate situations in which the Court is even admitting 
that the State may still be willing or able.  This exception within the federal-state system 
is already tenuous,126 but applied to the ICC-State system in which the supranational-
national law distinction is not very clear, this exception is probably unfeasible. 
 
Exceptions to Abstention Doctrine 
 Abstention is an exercise of judicial restraint when all “jurisdictional and 
justiciabilty requirements are met.”127 Although there are different theories as to how or 
why the federal courts should issue injunctions,128 the allowance for judicial restraint in 
light of state proceedings has been strongly imbued in the federal judicial system.129 
Exceptions to this presumption of deference must therefore battle an overarching 
systemic goal of promoting the interests of comity and federalism.  Naturally, the few 
circumstances that can justify a breach of the deference presumption are extreme 
situations.  Transferred into the ICC context, these are situations more relevant to a 
finding of unwillingness under Article 17(2), as opposed to inability under Article 17(3).  
Additionally, because the ICC does not have the ability to actually enjoin State 
proceedings, the equivalent of an injunction or declaratory relief would be determination 
that a case fulfills the Rome Statute’s admissibility requirements.  Lastly, the situations 
that qualify as exceptions under an abstention theory, unlike the exceptions to the final 
122 Id. at 1023-24. 
123 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
124 See Chemerinsky, supra note 33, at 676. 
125 Finality Rule, supra note 53, at 1006-07, 1025-26. 
126 Redish, supra note 66, at 254-55. 
127 Chemerinsky, supra note 33, at 761. 
128 For example, the Anti-Injunction Act was a statutory prohibition on federal court injunctions in state 
proceedings, with which some critics the Younger abstention as needlessly interfering.  See Martin Redish, 
Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L. J.. 71 (1984). 
129 Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, supra note 76, at pp. 545-52. 
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judgment rule, are not borderline instances of State mishandling which may involve 
merely inability without negative intent – rather, these are examples of clear State 
misconduct embodying a high level of intentional misconduct. 
 The Supreme Court in  Younger imagined that abstention would apply in all cases 
except for “exceptional circumstances” in which case the federal courts could exercise 
their jurisdiction.130 This reasoning closely tracks the explanation given in exhaustion 
doctrine, which cites “circumstances of peculiar urgency” as the only exceptions to the 
presumption of deference to states.131 The emphasis on how extreme these situations 
need to be mirrors the presumption which the Rome Statute places on the Court – that a 
case is considered inadmissible unless the Court can prove one of the situations justifying 
an exception. 
 Bad faith state prosecutions constitute the first type of exception recognized by 
the court in Younger.132 The embodiment of this exception was given by the example of 
Dombrowski v. Pfister, a case in which the state prosecutors utilized the courts for the 
purpose of harassing and intimidating civil rights activists as “part of a plan to employ 
arrests, seizures, and threats of prosecution under color of the statutes to harass appellants 
and discourage them and their supporters from asserting and attempting to vindicate the 
constitutional rights of Negro citizens of Louisiana.”133 In distinguishing Younger from 
Dombrowski, the Supreme Court noted that Dombrowski did “sufficiently establish the 
kind of irreparable injury, above and beyond that associated with the defense of a single 
prosecution brought in good faith, that had always been considered the very restricted 
circumstances under which an injunction could be justified.”134 The Supreme Court 
further elaborated, however, that “even irreparable injury is insufficient unless it is ‘both 
great and immediate.’”135 Although Younger itself did not qualify for an exception as a 
bad faith prosecution and no case since then has qualified for such an exception, 
theoretically a case of bad faith prosecution resulting in great and immediate irreparable 
injury would qualify. 
 In a scenario involving the ICC, a bad faith prosecution on the part of the State 
would not be a case  of harassment, but rather of excessive leniency for the defendant(s).  
The Court would not be aligned with the interests of parties who are being harassed, but 
rather with hypothetical petitioners (eg. victims) asking for an injunction of the national 
proceedings based on claims of irreparable injury.  Such a showing would fulfill the 
Article 17(2) definition of unwillingness because it would be a prosecution brought to 
shield a defendant, or unjustifiably delay or conduct an impartial hearing with an intent to 
avoid bringing the defendant to justice.136 The usefulness of the Dombrowski example is 
that it specifies what level of injury from the bad faith prosecution is needed to justify 
130 420 U.S. at 53-54. 
131 United States ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U.S. at 17. 
132 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 48-49. 
133 380 U.S. 479, 482 (1965). 
134 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 48. 
135 Id. at 46. 
136 Rome Statute, supra note 11, Art. 20(3).  This article on ne bis in idem also touches on these standards 
of shielding and independent or impartial proceedings.  The abstention doctrine, however, is more relevant 
to an Article 17 analogy because abstention occurs before the state court has completed its proceedings, 
while ne bis in idem is concerned with evaluation after conviction or acquittal, a doctrine more similar to 
exhaustion or final judgment. 
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intervention since the Rome Statute itself is vague as to any methods of measurement (eg. 
what qualifies as shielding).  In an ICC application of the rationale, the burden placed on 
the appellants in Dombrowski to prove their allegations of irreparable injury transfers to 
the ICC such that it must prove great and immediate irreparable injury.  Of course, the 
injury in an ICC case is not to the defendants who are benefiting from the leniency of the 
national courts.  The Court will have to act as a proxy for a combination of victims’ 
interests and the interest of the international community in order to show some type of 
injury resulting from the State’s bad faith prosecution.137 Particularly in the case of 
Darfur, the Security Council referral expressed the very specific wishes of the entire 
international community embodied in the UN,138 such that claiming an injury to the 
expressed interests of at least the international community, if not the victims of the 
alleged crimes, should not be difficult to fathom.   
 How to show an injury, however, is not readily apparent when there is a lack of a 
real petitioner.  The Court’s representation of hypothetical interests would still need to 
rely on proof of an irreparable injury to someone.  For example, if the Sudanese 
prosecution were conducted in bad faith, the ICC could allege a “great and immediate” 
irreparable injury to 1) the claims of victims who may lose their chance to press charges 
against the perpetrators, 2) victims who are continuing to suffer at the hands of janjaweed 
militia due to a lack of good faith prosecution, and/or 3) the international community’s 
ability to prevent Rome Statute crimes from occurring or to secure good faith trials 
through its referral process.  The scope of the harm would need to be proven the way the 
appellants in Dombrowski “had offered to prove that their offices had been raided and all 
their files and records seized pursuant to search and arrest warrants that were later 
summarily vacated by a state judge for lack of probable cause.  They also offered to 
prove that despite the state court order quashing the warrants and suppressing the 
evidence seized, the prosecutor was continuing to threaten to initiate new prosecutions of 
appellants under the same statutes, was holding public hearings at which photostatic 
copies of the illegally seized documents were being used, and was threatening to use 
other copies of the illegally seized documents to obtain grand jury indictments against the 
appellants on charges of violating the same statutes.”139 These types of allegations 
transferred to an ICC context might translate into repeated summary judgments 
dismissing consecutive claims against the defendant, continuing use of perjured 
testimony, ongoing threats of prosecution aimed at witnesses or victims, and other acts 
indicating perpetual violation of the victims’ and international community’s interest in a 
good faith prosecution.  Framing the unwillingness standards in the Dombrowski manner, 
as an exception to normal abstention doctrine, enables the Court to utilize vocabulary 
such as irreparable injury, and add dimensions such as “great and immediate,” to fill in 
the blanks left by Article 17(2).  
Another fruitful manner of applying the Younger bad faith exception is by 
examining which cases the Supreme Court designated as falling short of the Dombrowski 
137 There are various theories which designate the Court as the nexus of international interest in preventing 
the core crimes.  See Sadat, supra note 51, at 47-75; Broomhall, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 
42-43; Triffterer, supra note 6, at 23-32. 
138 See Condorelli and Villalplando, Can the Security Council Extend the ICC’s Jurisdiction?, in Cassese, 
et al, eds., supra note 7, at 627-40. 
139 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 48. 
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level of bad faith.  Since the federal courts have not granted a single bad faith exception 
post-Younger, the body of non-qualifying cases proves more relevant to defining which 
cases may qualify.140 For example, in Hicks v. Miranda, the Supreme Court refused to 
find bad faith or harassment through repeated seizures of the movie “Deep Throat” 
because the actions were conducted according to authorizing judicial orders.141 This 
hints at the idea that proof of the bad faith has to run from top to bottom, showing an 
intention to harass at every level.  This is similar to Juidice v. Vail, another case in which 
the Supreme Court found that the lack of bad faith on the part of the judges issuing the 
orders nullified the allegations of bad faith that would allow for an exception.142 The ICC 
might thereby want to focus, in addition to the overall nature of the prosecution, on 
alleging and proving bad faith on the part of the judges’ or judiciary bodies’ intent to 
enforce judicial orders “motivated by desire to harass or…conducted in bad faith.”143 
Younger’s second category of exception to abstention doctrine is for statutes that 
“might be flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every 
clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort 
might be made to apply it.”144 This class of exceptions may be almost extinct in federal 
courts today after Trainor v. Hernandez, in which the Supreme Court reversed a lower 
court finding that a state statute was violative of the due process clause without clarifying 
whether an unconstitutional statute would still justify an exception to abstention.145 The 
ICC, however, need only explore whether the original reasoning behind this exception is 
applicable to the Court’s burden of proving unwillingness.  A comparable case in the 
Darfur scenario would be if Sudan passed a statute which declared all defendants charged 
with crimes prior to April 2, 2005 (the date on which the Security Council referred Darfur 
to the ICC) either immune or pardoned.  Discussions about the nature of amnesties or 
pardons in relation to admissibility generally tend to recognize the admissibility of cases 
in which amnesty was doled out either during a proceeding or as the conclusion of a 
proceeding, but recognize the limitation of the Rome Statute in reaching instances of 
amnesties or pardons post-conviction.146 Based on Article 17, the assumption is that 
amnesties granted during the course of a proceeding automatically qualifies the trial as a 
“sham trial.”147 The Younger exception rationale can bolster this presumption by 
140 Within the federal courts, the criterion needed to grant this exception have proven to be extremely 
narrow.  See Fallon et al, supra note 65, at 1227.  The bad faith exception might be characterized as 
encompassing only those cases with “repeated prosecutions initiated by state officials solely for the purpose 
of harassment without the opportunity to raise the claims in state court because of the unavailability or bias 
of the state judiciary.”  Chemerinsky, supra note 33, at 832. 
141 422 U.S. 332 (1975).  Unlike Dombrowski, in which the continuing threats included the use of illegally 
seized documents, Hicks does not provide a showing of illegality. 
142 430 U.S. 327 (1977). 
143 Id. at 326.  
144 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 53-54 (citing Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 485-86 (1941)). 
145 431 U.S. 434 (1977). 
146 Amnesties granted during a trial can contribute to a finding of admissibility based on unwillingness, 
while amnesties and pardons granted in place of a trial do not bar the ICC under the ne bis in idem principle 
since they do not qualify as judgments.  See Van den Wyngaert and Ongena, supra note 51, at 726-27; 
Broomhall, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 100-102; Sadat, supra note 51, at 53-69. 
147 Van den Wyngaert and Ongena, supra note 51, at 726.  See also, Broomhall, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE,
supra note 6, at 94-96 (“Amnesties typically remain a tribute paid, in negotiations, to the fact of present 
power, and their acceptability under any circumstances remains controversial”). 
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pinpointing any specific legislation authorizing blanket amnesties or immunities and 
providing supplemental support for its dismissal.148 For cases of post-conviction 
measures, the Younger exception could become useful if it was able to indicate a piece of 
legislation rendering a broad swath of immunity or pardons such that compared to prior 
patterns of legislative enactment pursuant to a judgment, the new statute indicates blatant 
disregard for the standards exacted in the Rome Statute.  As such, this Younger exception 
provides another basis on which to compare national proceedings against their own 
histories, even if, in the end, the rarity of amnesties or pardons through statutory means 
will render this exception minimally useful. 
 The third Younger exception includes a few sub-topics encompassed in the 
broader category of situations in which the state lacks an adequate forum to adjudicate 
the issue.  The reason can be bias or a finding that the state courts fail to offer an 
adequate remedy.149 Younger does not seem to explicitly lay out the boundaries of this 
third exception such that the confirmation of the exception’s existence consists of the 
subsequent cases which presume the exception, yet the inadequate state forum exception 
is the most substantial of the exceptions stemming from Younger.150 Gibson v. Berryhill 
was one of the earliest cases to utilize this third exception.151 In Gibson, the plaintiffs 
complained that the Alabama Board of Optometry suffered from an incurable bias that 
prevented it from providing them with a “fair and impartial hearing in conformity with 
due process of law.”152 The Supreme Court agreed that the state proceedings were biased 
based on the fact that “those with substantial pecuniary interest in legal proceedings 
should not adjudicate these disputes,” and possibly also because the Board may have a 
prejudicial notion against the plaintiffs already.153 The federal branch’s willingness to 
intervene, however, is circumscribed somewhat by Kugler v. Helfant, a case in which the 
state rules allowing for judicial recusal was a sufficient safeguard against system-wide 
bias such that it was not shown that the overall state court system could not provide an 
unbiased process.154 
Transplanted into the ICC context, the Gibson rationale requires a showing by the 
Court that the national proceedings suffer from a bias (such as substantial pecuniary gain) 
so severe that it pervades the whole system, or that the ruling parties in the proceedings 
had previously engaged in behavior indicative of their predetermined disposition (such as 
148 Exceptions such as the creation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa highlight 
the difficulty of the presumption that all amnesties lead to sham trials inconsistent with the goals of the 
Rome Statute.  See Broomhall, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 101; Sadat, supra note 51, at 59-
69. 
149 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 45 (citing Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243-44 (1926), “‘[C]ases have 
established the doctrine that, when absolutely necessary for protection of constitutional rights, court of the 
United States have power to enjoin state officers from instituting criminal actions.  But this may not be 
done, except under extraordinary circumstances, where the danger of irreparable loss is both great and 
immediate.  Ordinarily, there should be no interference with such officers….The accused should first set up 
and rely upon his defense in the state courts, even though this involves a challenge of the validity of some 
statute, unless it plainly appears that this course would not afford adequate protection.’”). 
150 Brian Stagner, Avoiding Abstention: The Younger Exceptions, 29 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 137, 163-64 
(1998). 
151 411 U.S. 564 (1973) 
152 Id. at 570. 
153 Id. at 578-79. 
154 421 U.S. 117 (1975). 
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an attorney who formerly defended the defendant sitting as a judge).  The Court in 
making the case for a showing of unwillingness thus needs to focus both on showing that 
the national system overall does not have sufficient safeguards to guarantee an unbiased 
system, not just one or two unbiased judges, and on proving that the judges or 
administering bodies have substantial stakes in the outcome of the case. 
 The second aspect of the inadequate state forum exception is based on whether 
the state proceeding is able to provide a remedy.  The Supreme Court addressed this in 
Gerstein v. Pugh, a case in which the federal courts, referring only briefly to Younger,
held that “relief was not barred by the equitable restrictions on federal intervention in 
state prosecutions.…The injunction was not directed at the state prosecutions as such, but 
only at the legality of pretrial detention without a judicial hearing, an issue that could not 
be raised in defense of the criminal prosecution.  The order to hold preliminary hearings 
could not prejudice the conduct of the trial on the merits.”155 This reading of the 
exception recalls the second class of exceptions under the final judgment rule – the 
survival of an important federal interest which the state has no way of adequately 
addressing.  As in that context, the application of this rationale to an ICC situation is 
tricky because the lack of a state remedy is not clearly grounds for intervention.  For 
example, Sudan has a provision allowing use of force to resist an illegal warrant for 
arrest.156 If a defendant killed many people but claimed this provision as a defense and 
the State found the claim reasonable, the ICC may find itself unable to point to any 
unwillingness or inability other than the fact that the national law is different than the 
Rome Statute.  Unless the state provisions are in some way applied with bias or in such a 
way as to cause great irreparable injury, the usefulness of the Gerstein manner of 
evaluation may not prove very useful for the ICC. 
 The lack of an adequate state remedy is, however, different from the complete 
absence of a state proceeding.  Although this is not strictly an exception to abstention 
doctrine, the Supreme Court was quick to point out that Younger abstention principles are 
not applicable to a situation in which the state is not conducting proceedings.  In Steffel v. 
Thompson, the Supreme Court specifically found, “When no state criminal proceeding is 
pending at the time the federal complaint is filed, considerations of equity, comity, and 
federalism on which Younger v. Harris, and Samuels v. Mackell…were based, have little 
vitality: federal intervention does not result in duplicative legal proceedings or disruption 
of the state criminal justice system; nor can federal intervention, in that circumstance, be 
interpreted as reflecting negatively upon the state courts’ ability to enforce constitutional 
principles.”157 Effectively stripping the federal courts of any need to justify federal 
action, the Steffel rationale applied to the ICC is similar to one of the initial 
complementarity propositions – that the ICC faces no obstacle in an “inaction 
scenario.”158 As discussed earlier, once a State decides to initiate its own proceedings, 
the ICC will in almost every situation need to defer to the State proceedings unless or 
until the Court can prove an exception to the inadmissibility presumption.  Steffel is 
simply another theory to bolster the Court’s initial right to intervene. 
155 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 108 fn. 9 (1975). 
156 Abdalla Hassan Salim, RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED IN THE SUDAN 15 (1983). 
157 415 U.S. 452, 453 (1974). 
158 Complementarity in Practice, supra note 25, at p.7. 
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Another tangent of exceptions to Younger abstention is the fact that a state may 
waive its right to argue for the application of abstention principles and thereby 
voluntarily submit to a federal forum.  The Supreme Court found in Ohio Bureau of 
Employment Services v. Hodory, “If the State voluntarily chooses to submit to a federal 
forum, principles of comity do not demand that the federal court force the case back into 
the State’s own system.”159 Similarly, the majority of the ICC’s jurisdiction is built on a 
foundation of State consent.160 Under Article 13(a) and (c) respectively, the Court may 
exercise its jurisdiction if the situation is referred by a State Party (that possesses 
jurisdiction over the matter initially) or if the Prosecutor uses his proprio motu powers.  
Both of these scenarios require the State’s acceptance of the Court’s exercise of 
jurisdiction161 and are therefore theoretically analogous to voluntary waivers of Younger 
abstention.  The voluntary waiver, however, can be used not only to allow federal court 
proceedings, but even to urge the federal system to take over the case.162 In drafting the 
Rome Statute, nobody contemplated that States would so willingly refer cases to the 
Court because State sovereignty interests were so high.163 The worry now is that national 
courts, in referring their cases voluntarily, will actually be doing so to the detriment of 
the underlying principles of complementarity.  The presumption of deference to State 
proceedings underscores the intention of the Rome Statute to create a system in which 
States do not shirk their duty to prosecute the core crimes.164 The Court’s continued 
acceptance of self-referral cases waiving complementarity, while necessary if the need 
for investigation and prosecution exists, may undercut the effectiveness of national 
regimes.  The ICC must be aware of the likelihood that States may take advantage of the 
fact that they can waive their primary jurisdiction and proceed to a “‘selective or 
asymmetrical self-referral’ where the de jure government is itself party to an internal 
armed conflict.”165 In such a situation, the Court needs to be aware of the politics at stake 
and adhere to its duty to investigate entire situations, as opposed to just specific cases.166 
State waivers in favor of the ICC forum are thus both an easement of the Court’s duty to 
abide by a Younger-type abstention, but it can also cause the Court difficulty in 
maintaining its independence and the viability of the complementarity regime. 
Another interesting aspect to the issue of waivers and referrals is a referral to the 
ICC according to Article 13(b) by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the 
United Nations Charter.  As seen in the Darfur referral, Sudan is not a State Party and is 
not voluntarily waiving the complementarity principle.  The extent to which a state may 
159 431 U.S. 471, 480 (1977). 
160 Article 12(1) declares that “A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the 
jurisdiction of the court with respect to the crimes referred to in article 5.”  See Lattanzi, supra note 77, at 
6-7. 
161 Hans-Peter Kaul, Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction, in Cassese et al, eds., supra note 7, at 
p.606. 
162 Stagner, supra note 150, at 176-77. 
163 Claus Kress, Self-Referrals and Waivers of Complementarity: Some Considerations in Law and Policy,
2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 944, 944-45 (2004).  
164 Rome Statute, supra note 11, Preamble para. 6 (“Recalling that it is the duty of every State to exercise its 
criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.”). 
165 Kress, supra note 163, at 946-47.  See also, Broomhall, Overview and Cooperation, supra note 8, at 80 
(“States Parties may for a variety of reasons sometimes prefer that jurisdiction is exercised by the ICC.”). 
166 El Zeidy, supra note 7, at 914-15 (citing the intentional selection of the term “situation” as opposed to 
“cases” because it narrowed the Court’s “independence in the exercise of its jurisdiction.”). 
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involuntarily waive the Younger abstention doctrine is also an issue that plagues the 
federal courts.  The federal courts have decided that states can actually involuntarily 
waive the Younger abstention principles and that federal courts may consider the 
abstention doctrine sua sponte.167 In the ICC realm, these concerns are slightly different 
because the Court has an obligation under Article 53(1)(b) to consider admissibility 
issues such that considering admissibility sua sponte is already assumed.  The issue of 
whether States may involuntarily waive into an ICC proceeding, however, is more of a 
political and practical issue than a jurisdictional issue.168 The Rome Statute confers the 
ICC with jurisdiction, but investigating, prosecuting and enforcing a judgment without 
any cooperation from the State would be difficult, if not impossible.  The Security 
Council referral, by virtue of it extending from the UN and with it the UN’s own powers, 
endows the ICC only with an additional ally and resource, but it does not extend the 
Court’s jurisdiction beyond what Article 13(b) allows.169 Involuntary waiver in the ICC 
sense thus only arises in the context of a Security Council referral and results in more 
reliance on the UN’s capabilities to coerce cooperation than in the ICC’s ability to 
impose its jurisdiction. 
 
Possible Future Grounds for ICC Admissibility Exceptions 
 There are several additional theories of federal courts doctrine that may also be 
relevant to the ICC structure, but which will only be touched on briefly here.  The notion 
of independent and adequate state grounds as justification for federal deference to state 
decisions provides another fruitful area for comparison with ICC admissibility 
proceedings.  The basic proposition of the independent and adequate doctrine comes from 
the idea that if the decision of the highest state court rests on grounds that are 
independent of the federal grounds and the state grounds are adequate to support the 
decision, then the federal court should not review even the federal issue.170 To be 
independent, the state ground “must not be intertwined with or dependent upon a federal 
question either explicitly or implicitly.”171 To be considered adequate, “A decision based 
on state law…would necessarily be affirmed even if any decision on federal law were 
reversed.”172 These grounds for independent and adequate in an ICC context, however, 
might be “lost in translation” because of the difference between the national-
supranational relationship and the state-federal relationship.  The lack of distinct 
167 Stagner, supra note 150, at 177. 
168 Sadat and Carden, supra note 1, at 414-15 (“Complementarity has a substantive component, a 
procedural component, and a component that we will call ‘political,’ or ‘prudential’ for lack of a better 
term.…The prudential aspect refers to the policy choices made in deciding what kinds of cases should be in 
the ICC, rather than national courts, which, as noted above, means that some cases that are clearly within 
the Court’s jurisdiction (prescriptively) will not be heard by the Court.”).  See also, Kenneth Abbott, Robert 
Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik et al, The Concept of Legalization, 54 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 401 
(2000) (noting the increasing tendency to make political decisions through legal institutions). 
169 Condorelli and Villalplando, supra note 138, at 571. 
170 See Chemerinsky, supra note 33, at 686. 
171 Thomas Baker, The Ambiguous Independent and Adequate State Ground in Criminal Cases: Federalism 
Along a Mobius Strip, 19 GA. L. REV. 799 (1985) (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) and 
Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940)). 
172 Richard Matasar and Gregory Bruch, Procedural Common Law, Federal Jurisdictional Policy, and 
Abandonment of the Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1291, 1292 
fn. 2 (1986) (citing Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935)). 
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supranational grounds as opposed to the national grounds currently seems to imply that 
all national grounds are independent and adequate for whatever decision the State makes. 
 Eventually, however, the ICC may need to delve further into how it will cope with 
the gap between national proceedings on the ordinary crimes basis and proceedings 
utilizing the Rome Statute language.  Finding the ordinary crimes proceedings to not be 
independent or adequate in relation to the supranational law might be just one method of 
distinguishing them from Rome Statute standards such that the ICC can intervene an 
unwilling or unable finding.173 Solidifying such a stance will require, more or less, a 
presumption that States should implement legislation incorporating the core crimes into 
their national laws or else suffer a finding that their ordinary crime laws are inadequate or 
not independent of Rome Statute issues.174 
Conclusion 
 The complementarity regime serves as the gatekeeper for any investigations and 
prosecutions the ICC may be facing.  Complementarity’s most interesting feature, 
however, is its dual role as both a guard that keeps the Court’s jurisdiction from reaching 
beyond its mandate and as an usher that sweeps cases into the ICC’s jurisdiction when 
States shirk their duties.  The admissibility requirement based on a showing of State 
unwillingness or inability is the aperture through which all proceedings must pass.   
 The complementarity regime also highlights the difficult nature of the 
supranational-national relationship and focuses the Court’s limitations in a way that 
accommodates comparison with the federal-state relationship.  Through these doctrines 
of exhaustion, finality, and abstention, the Court is able to take a glimpse at what its 
future might entail.  Any suggestions for what the Court might attempt to accomplish 
with referrals such as Darfur may stem from the comparison. 
 
173 Some scholars believe admissibility based on discrepancies in legal systems to be a foregone conclusion.  
See Broomhall, Overview and Cooperation, supra note 8, at 81 (“the absence from national law of the 
prohibitions, defences, general principles and sentences set out in the Statute could support a finding of 
admissibility by the Court on the grounds of inaction at the national level.…This could be the case where 
national law has definitions of crimes that are too narrow, general principles of law more restrictive than 
those in the Statute, or defences which are overly broad.  In such cases, the State would not be able to 
impose criminal responsibility on acts criminal under the Statute, resulting in de facto impunity.  The 
resulting inaction could render the case admissible although, presumably, the gap between national law and 
the Statute would have to be a significant one before the Court would consider exercising jurisdiction, if 
national authorities were otherwise proceeding in good faith.”)  Even so, the argument that a procedural 
rule is not a bar to jurisdiction leaves the Court with the ne bis in idem bar under Article 20.  It would seem 
that, unless the Court could show that the State had pursued the case knowing that it would, or intending to, 
encounter the procedural obstacle, the ICC could not prosecute the case. 
174 In the end, complementarity, in order to function, necessitates an adaptation by States of the Rome 
Statute standards.  See Kleffner, supra note 47, at 94 (“in order for the ICC to effectively perform its 
complementary function, comprehensive implementation is indispensable.  To interpret the provisions on 
complementarity so as to give them the fullest weight and effect consistent with the ICC’s functions 
therefore involves an obligation on States parties to establish their jurisdiction over the ICC crimes to the 
extent required for the purpose of national prosecution.”). 
